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I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

The year 2009 has been in many respects spectacular for
international criminal justice. Looking back on each of the past ten
to fifteen years one has the impression that it is hardly possible that
more developments take place than in the previous year, but we are
always proven wrong. It seems that each year tops the previous one
in terms of creation of new institutions, abundance of case law and
legislative efforts. This in spite of the fact that the big ad hoc
tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (“ICTR”) have been engaged in their respective completion
strategies for quite a few years.
But new experiments in
international criminal justice, such as the Extraordinary Chambers in
the Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”) and the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon (“STL”), and the growing body of jurisprudence of the
International Criminal Court (“ICC”) make up for any reduced
(investigative) activity of the UN ad hoc Tribunals.
A full overview of all interesting developments in the year
2009 would by far exceed a reasonably sized paper. Furthermore,
there exist excellent and more frequently appearing overviews of
developments in international criminal justice, to which I gladly
refer the interested reader.1 I have thus decided to make a selection.
Guiding me in this selection are the problems in securing adequate
protection of human rights in the international criminal justice
system. We are increasingly encountering incidents and situations,
∗

Professor in the law of international criminal procedure.
See, e.g., the ‘Highlights’ section in the Journal of International Criminal Justice
and also the regular discussions of case law in the Leiden Journal of International
Law.
1
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which seriously raise the question whether the strong interest in
effective prosecution tends to override the minimum standards of
due process.
II. THE RIGHT TO BE TRIED WITHOUT UNDUE DELAY2
¶3

It is known that the periods within which persons indicted by
the ICTY and ICTR are tried are sometimes disconcertingly long.
These periods run from the moment of arrest until finalization of all
proceedings.3 While the ICTY has experienced its share of long
proceedings,4 the most extreme cases can be found at the ICTR.
After preceding case law where the ICTR Appeals Chamber had
established that periods of approximately eight years did not amount
to a violation of the right to be tried without undue delay,5 the ICTR
Trial Chamber was confronted at the end of 2008 with the question
2

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C.
Res 827, Art. 21(4)(c), UN SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th Mtg. at 1-2, U.N. Doc.
S/Res/827 (May 25, 1993); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, Art. 20(4)(c), UN SCOR 49th Sess., 3453d Mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/Res/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
Art. 67(1)(c), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (July 17, 1998); Statute of the Special
Court for Sierra Leone, Art. 17(4)(c), U.N. Doc. S/2002/246, Appx. II (Jan. 16,
2002). This right is protected by other international agreements as well.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Res. 2200A (XXI), 21,
Art. 14(3)(c), U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16,
1996); European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 6(1), ETS 5 (Nov. 4, 1950);
American Convention on Human Rights, OAS Treaty Series No. 36, Art. 8(1)
(Nov. 11, 1969).
3
See Kangasluoma v. Finland, 2004 Eur. Ct. H.R. 29, ¶ 26 (“the period to be
taken into account in the assessment of the length of the proceedings starts from
an official notification given to an individual by the competent authority of an
allegation that he has committed a criminal offence or from some other act which
carries the implication of such an allegation and which likewise substantially
affects the situation of the suspect”).
4
For example, the first accused at the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), Dusko Tadić, was arrested in February 1994 in
Germany, for crimes related to the Omarska camp. Proscutor v. Tadic, Case No.
IT-94-1-A and IT-94-1-Abis, ¶ 2 Judgement in Sentencing Appeals (January 26,
2000). The final judgement was issued approximately six years later. Id. It must
be mentioned, however, that the period between his arrest and his first conviction
was a little over three years. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion
and Judgement (May 7, 1997).
5
Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Appeals Judgement, ¶¶
1076-1077 (November 28, 2007).
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whether the accused in Prosecutor v. Bagosora (“Military I”)
received adequate protection from this right.6 The accused had
suffered from eleven and twelve years of detention until their cases
were decided in first instance; at present, they are all engaged in
appeal proceedings and it cannot be said when the proceedings will
be finalized and what the totality of the period ultimately will be.
These aforementioned periods may seem unacceptable to
every reasonable observer. Twelve years of trial duration and pretrial detention—in a context where the average life expectancy is
54.1 years7—is absolutely shameful. As to the law, the reasoning
proffered by the Trial Chamber is unconvincing and leaves the
reader with the uncomfortable feeling that an upper limit for the
duration of a trial may never be established at the international level.
If twelve years won’t do it, maybe fifteen, maybe twenty; we simply
do not know. The reasoning adopted by all ICTR Chambers makes
maximum use of all the flexible variables included in the law on
“trial without undue delay” in such a manner that any result can be
justified.
It may be necessary to set out the basic parameters under
international human rights law to determine undue delay. No
specific time-limit exists, and the reasonableness will clearly depend
on the circumstances of the case, having regard to the complexity of
the case, the conduct of the accused, and the conduct of the relevant
authorities.8 The latter is in fact the most important factor.9 The
highly flexible nature of this assessment has resulted in human
rights case law where an apparently short duration produced a
violation, whereas an apparently very long duration was regarded as
lawful. The flexible nature of the right is further illustrated by the
opportunity for states to avoid liability for a violation when the
affected person is compensated for the excessive length, in the form
of an adequate reduction of the sentence.10
6

See Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Judgement (Dec. 18,
2008).
7
UN Data: Life Expectancy at Birth, Both Sexes Combined for Rawnda (20152020), http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=PopDiv&f=variableID%3A68 (last visited
June 20, 2010).
8
See, e.g., Philis v. Greece, 1997 Eur. Ct. H.R. 34, ¶ 35. See also Prosecutor v.
Kanyabashi, Case No. ICTR-96-15-T, ICTR, Decision on the Defence Extremely
Urgent Motion on Habeas Corpus and For Stoppage of Proceedings (May 23,
2000) (adopting same criteria).
9
STEFAN TRECHSEL, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 146 (2005).
10
Id. at 148.

2010]
¶6
¶7

¶8

¶9

GÖRAN SLUITER

251

The Trial Chamber in Military I committed at least four
discernable errors in its treatment of the matter.
First, it repeated the mistake made by the ICTR Appeals
Chamber, which rejected a comparison with time frames in domestic
criminal courts, because they were found “not particularly
persuasive given the inherent complexity of international
proceedings.”11 In its reasoning, the Trial Chamber did not refer to
international human rights case law and resorted to a self-referential
analysis, in which apparently it was a small step from eight years as
reasonable to twelve years as reasonable. What one expects from the
Chamber is an application of human rights law as minimum
standards to the situation at hand. Clearly, the complexity of
proceedings can serve to prolong the duration of the reasonable
period, but this must be properly explained and certainly complexity
can never serve to justify delays ad infinitum.
Second, it follows from the Chamber’s reasoning that in
determining the period as reasonable the complexity of the
proceedings was a decisive consideration.12 Interestingly, the
complexity of proceedings is dealt with as a given, for which
apparently no one is to blame. This is naive and wrong. The
Prosecutor can be held responsible in two ways for trials of extreme
duration. At the beginning, he carries significant responsibility for
delays by submitting indictments in a system that is incapable of
handling them within a reasonable period of time. Furthermore, the
complexity of prosecutions is the direct result of prosecutorial
choices, namely the selection of charges.
Third, if the delay cannot be attributed to a specific party, as
the Trial Chamber in Military I established,13 this cannot be a
ground to ignore violations of individual rights. As ruled in
Barayagwiza, sharing of fault between organs of the tribunal should
not affect the application of fundamental rights.14

11

Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Judgement, ¶ 80 (citing
Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Appeals Judgement, ¶¶ 107677 (Nov. 28, 2007)).
12
Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 78 – 82.
13
Id. ¶ 82.
14
Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision, ¶ 73 (Nov.
1999).
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Fourth, the Trial Chamber made the puzzling finding that
they could not identify any prejudice caused by the delay with
respect to the two accused who received life sentences.15 This is
inconsistent with the presumption of innocence and the principle
that the reasonable duration of the trial must be assessed
independently. Furthermore, it is a mistake to find that the accused
suffered no prejudice; they clearly did, as they had to wait eleven
and twelve years before knowing the (provisional) outcome of their
case.
The Trial Chamber’s decision on the duration of the trial
does a disservice to proper respect of human rights norms. It ignores
the function of the ICTR as a role model for criminal proceedings
and creates the risk that national courts can justify lengthy
proceedings by referring to the practice of the ICTR. It is my view
that a violation of the right had to be established; at the very least, a
proper analysis had to be conducted, indicating what the reasonable
limits for the duration of trials are. The Trial Chamber could have
easily expressed its discomfort and could have determined that a
violation of the right to be tried without undue delay had occurred,
without this having to have far-reaching consequences. Remedies
could have been confined to an appropriate reduction of the sentence
imposed.
III. THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION

¶12

The ICTY Appeals Chamber pronounced its judgment in the
Krajišnik case on March 17, 2009; the accused was sentenced to
twenty years of imprisonment.16 An important element of the
appeals was the accused’s claim that he received ineffective
representation for a very large part of the trial proceedings, which
allegedly violated his fair trial rights.17 It was not the first time the
Appeals Chamber was confronted with claims of ineffective
representation by counsel. It happened in the cases of Tadić,18

15

Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Judgement, ¶ 83.
See Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-A, Judgement, (Mar. 17, 2009).
17
Id. ¶ 395.
18
See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on Appellant's Motion
for the Extension of the Time-Limit and Admission of Additional Evidence, (Oct.
15, 1998); Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-R, Decision on Motion for
Review (July 30, 2002).
16
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Akayesu,19 and Blagojević.20 The applicable test for ineffective
representation was set out in Akayesu:
77. With respect to the applicable tests for assessing counsel’s
ineptitude, the Appeals Chamber endorses the tests applied by
ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Tadić Decision. In this regard,
ICTY Appeals Chamber held that an Appellant alleging
incompetence of counsel must show the “gross incompetence”
of the latter. The Appellant may do so by “demonstrat[ing] that
there was reasonable doubt as to whether a miscarriage of
justice resulted.” Indeed, “(..)when evidence was not called
because of the advice of the defence counsel in charge at the
time, it cannot be right for the Appeals Chamber to admit
additional evidence in such a case, even if it were to disagree
with the advice given by counsel. The unity of identity between
client and counsel is indispensable to the workings of the
International Criminal Tribunal. If counsel acted despite the
wishes of the Appellant, in the absence of protest at the time,
and barring special circumstances which do not appear, the
latter must be taken to have acquiesced …”
78. In other words, the Statute of the Tribunal affords an
indigent accused the right to be represented by a competent
counsel. The latter is presumed to be competent and such a
presumption of competence can only be rebutted by evidence to
the contrary. In most cases, the accused would have to show
prejudice as set out in the above-mentioned Tadić Decision and
should such prejudice be proven, the Appeals Chamber would
have to acknowledge that the right of the Accused as guaranteed
under the Statute had been violated. However, even if such
prejudice is not proven the question remains, as to whether the
proven incompetence constitutes a violation of the statutory
right of the accused to assistance by competent counsel and
would consequently warrant a remedy.21 (footnotes omitted)

¶13

The combined standard of “gross incompetence” and on that
basis “demonstrat[ing] that there was reasonable doubt as to whether
a miscarriage of justice resulted” seems quite high and
unreasonable, for at least two reasons. First, lying at the foundation
of this test is the assumption of competent counsel. But lacking
19

See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-A, Judgement (June 1, 2001).
Prosecutor v. Blagojević and Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-A, A. Ch., Judgement
(May 9, 2007).
21
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Sentencing Judgement, ¶ 77-8
(June 1, 2001).
20
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proper selection and training mechanisms, to mention just two, the
ICTY and ICTR simply cannot guarantee competence of counsel to
the same degree as a well-functioning domestic criminal justice
system. Second, it has never been properly explored by the ICTY
and ICTR how their standard relates to human rights law and
standards developed in adversarial criminal justice systems. The
adversarial-based standard, employed in such states as the United
States, is relevant to the ICTY and ICTR, which by and large
follows an adversarial procedural system.
In international human rights law we are confronted with two
slightly diverging standards. In the context of the European
Convention of Human Rights (“ECHR”) national authorities only
have to intervene “if a failure by legal aid counsel to provide
effective representation is manifest or sufficiently brought to their
attention in some other way.”22 “Manifest ineffective
representation” is not easily established, as counsel acting against
the wishes of his client is not necessarily considered to be
ineffective.23 In death penalty cases—which concerns the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”)—a
more demanding standard has been adopted; the state has a positive
duty to ensure that the legal assistance provided is effective.24
At the national level, it is worth referring to U.S. case law. In
the United States, according to Strickland v. Washington, the
“proper standard for [measuring] attorney performance is that of
reasonably effective assistance” as guided by “prevailing
professional norms” and consideration of “all the circumstances”
relevant to counsel’s performance.25

22

Kamasinski v. Austria, App. No. 9783/82, Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 65
(1989) (available at http://www.echr.coe/int/eng).
23
Id. ¶ 70.
24
Views of the Human Rights Committee Under Art. 5, Para. 4 of the Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, Jam., July 15,
1996, CCPR/C/57/D/537/1993. See Kelly v. Jamaica, Communication 537/1993,
Views adopted on 17 July 1996, UN Doc. CCPR/C/57/D/537/1993 and
Communication No. 355/1989, Views adopted on 8 July 1994, UN Doc.
CCPR/C/51/D/355/1989 (1994).
25
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The major conclusions of that
landmark decision concerning effective representation can be summarized as
follows:
(a) to establish ineffective assistance requiring reversal of a conviction, a
defendant must show both
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The problem with all ICTY and ICTR case law in respect to
the right to effective representation, as an essential ingredient of the
right to a fair trial, is that its own standard has never been explained
or justified in light of human rights case law and relevant national
case law (i.e. case law in adversarial criminal justice systems). The
international jurisprudence is, again, highly self-referential. It is my
view that the standard of effective representation developed and
applied by the ICTY and ICTR is too high in relation to other
relevant standards, especially given that the ICTY and ICTR offer
no credible guarantees for the assumption of competence. Although
the death penalty is not an available punishment in international
criminal justice, all cases deal with extremely serious accusations,
which may lead to the most serious penalties. Under these
circumstances, it seems logical to adopt the ICCPR standard
applicable to death penalty-cases, namely the positive duty
incumbent upon the ICTY to ensure that legal assistance is effective.
Simply too much is at stake.
The problems in respect of finding an appropriate standard
are very well illustrated by the Krajišnik case. Interestingly, the
Appeals Chamber went some way in agreeing with Krajišnik that
the assistance he received from counsel was ineffective. It
acknowledged that the work product handed over from the first to
second counsel “was not in as good a state as it should have been,”26
that there was insufficient preparation of the Defence team at the
beginning of the trial,27 and that the Defence’s review of the
(i) that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and
(ii) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense;
(b) the ‘proper standard for [measuring] attorney performance is that of
reasonably effective assistance’, as guided by ‘prevailing professional
norms’ and consideration of ‘all the circumstances’ relevant to counsel’s
performance;
(c) more specific guidelines in applying that standard are not appropriate;
and
(d) the proper standard for measuring prejudice is whether there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceedings would be different. WAYNE LAFAVE ET AL.,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, (3rd Ed. 2007) at 635 (For a detailed analysis of
the law concerning ineffective representation see 635–46).
26
Krajišnik, Judgement, supra note 16, ¶ 47.
27
Id. ¶ 54.
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disclosure material was imperfect.28 Throughout its analysis the
Appeals Chamber ruled that no gross negligence was established
and/or no miscarriage of justice occurred. It failed, however, to
substantiate those findings. It would be particularly interesting to
learn what type of ineffective representation would amount to gross
negligence and would occasion a miscarriage of justice. Indeed, the
observer is left with the impression that Krajišnik has suffered
significant prejudice from ineffective representation. What is more,
the Appeals Chamber deals with instances of ineffective
representation separately, but does not consider properly their
combined effect.
One cannot help wondering whether the completion strategy
has anything to do with dismissal of what appears a fairly solid and
legitimate appellate ground. Clearly, in case of acceptance, a new
trial would be necessary, causing serious delay. The concerns
expressed by Judge Hunt in relation to effects of the completion
strategy are worth citing:
21. The international community has entrusted the Tribunal with
the task of trying persons charged with serious violations of
international humanitarian law. It expects the Tribunal to do so
in accordance with those rights of the accused to which
reference is made in the previous paragraph. If the Tribunal is
not given sufficient time and money to do so by the international
community, then it should not attempt to try those persons in a
way which does not accord with those rights. In my opinion, it
is improper to take the Completion Strategy into account in
departing from interpretations which had earlier been accepted
by the Appeals Chamber where this is at the expense of those
rights.
22. This Tribunal will not be judged by the number of
convictions which it enters, or by the speed with which it
concludes the Completion Strategy which the Security Council
has endorsed, but by the fairness of its trials. The Majority
Appeals Chamber Decision and others in which the Completion
Strategy has been given priority over the rights of the accused
will leave a spreading stain on this Tribunal’s reputation.29

28

Id. ¶ 63.
ICTY, Dissenting Opinion of Judge David Hunt on Admissibility of EvidenceIn-Chief in the Form of Written Statements, Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT02-54-AR73.4, A. Ch. (October 21 2003), ¶¶ 21, 22.

29
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IV. “FIGHTING IMPUNITY” AS AN INTERPRETATIVE TOOL OF SOURCES
OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
¶19

¶20

In 2009 we have seen two ICC Appeals Chamber decisions
which reveal a dangerous trend in interpretative methodology of key
instruments of international criminal justice, i.e. statutes of
international criminal tribunals. As I will demonstrate below, the
aim of international criminal tribunals to put an end to impunity has
been attributed a prominent place in the interpretation of statutes and
other relevant sources of international criminal law. Indeed, the
object and purpose of statutes, applying the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, are important factors in getting to the correct
interpretation of provisions.30 But if the fight against impunity is
taking on an important dimension in interpretative questions, one
can easily imagine that interpretations in favour of effective
prosecution loom on the horizon. This will especially be the case
when interpretative rules used in criminal justice, such as the rule of
lenity and the maxim in dubio pro reo which favour the accused, are
insufficiently taken into account to counterbalance a predisposition
towards effective prosecution.
There is an increasing concern of a significant proprosecution bias in international criminal justice. Darryl Robinson
has offered highly interesting observations about how this can be
explained:
In a typical criminal law context, liberal sensitivities focus on
constraining the use of the state’s coercive power against
individuals. In ICL, however, prosecution and conviction are
often conceptualized as the fulfilment of the victims’ human
right to a remedy. Such a conceptualization encourages reliance
on human rights methodology and norms. This shift in
conceptualization also shifts the preoccupation of participants in
the system. Many traditionally liberal actors (such as nongovernmental organizations or academics),who in a national
system would vigilantly protect defendants and potential
defendants, are among the most strident pro-prosecution voices,
arguing for broad definitions and modes of liability and for
30

The cardinal rule of treaty interpretation is set out in Article 31(1) of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties: “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in
their context and in light of its object and purpose.” Vienna Convention on the
Laws of Treaties, May 23, 1969 art. 31(1) 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
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narrow defences, in order to secure convictions and thereby
fulfil the victim’s right to justice. Whereas in a national system
one may hear that it is preferable to let ten guilty persons go free
rather than to convict one innocent person, the ICL literature
seems to strike the balance rather differently, replete as it is with
fears that defendants might “escape conviction” or “escape
accountability” unless inculpating principles are broadened
further and exculpatory principles narrowed.31 (footnotes
omitted)

¶21

¶22

¶23

While the pro-prosecution bias can thus be explained, a
mature justice system requires that judges take care in resisting such
temptation. In the interpretation and application of the law they thus
have to refrain from using a methodology that is clearly the result of
and strengthens such bias.
The first decision revealing a pro-prosecution biased
interpretation is the Appeals Chamber’s ruling on Katanga’s
admissibility challenge.32 In determining the proper interpretation of
Article 17(1) of the ICC Statute—how it relates to situations of
inaction—the Appeals Chamber used the fifth and fourth paragraphs
of the Rome Statute as a basis for a “purposive interpretation” of the
Statute.33 This purposive interpretation did not seem to produce
direct negative results for the accused, because the matter was
concerned with adequate division of cases among the ICC and
national justice systems. But one can easily imagine how the
emphasis on ending impunity can result in interpretations prejudicial
to the accused.
An example where this could have taken place is the Appeals
Chamber’s decision on Regulation 55. On December 8, 2009, the
ICC Appeals Chamber issued its judgement on the changes to the
legal characterisation of the facts—pursuant to Regulation 55 (2)—

31

Darryl Robinson, The Identity Crisis of International Criminal Law, 21 LEIDEN
J. OF INT’L L. 925, 930-931 (2008).
32
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC01/04-01/07 OA 8, Judgement on the Appeal of Germain Katanga against the Oral
Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of the Case
(2009).
33
Id. ¶ 79.
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in the Lubanga case.34 Regarding the interpretations of Article 61(9)
of the Statute and Regulation 55,35 the Appeals Chamber stated:

The Appeals Chamber is not persuaded by the interpretation of
article 61(9) of the Statute put forward by Mr Lubanga Dyilo.
First, the Appeals Chamber recalls that article 61(9) addresses
primarily the powers of the Prosecutor to seek an amendment,
addition or substitution of the charges, at his or her own
initiative and prior to the commencement of the trial; the terms
of the provision do not exclude the possibility that a Trial
Chamber modifies the legal characterisation of the facts on its
34

Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07 OA 8, Decision giving
notice to the parties and participants that the legal characterization of the facts
may be subject to change in accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations
of the Court, (July 14, 2009) (hereinafter Lubanga Judgement).
35
These provisions read as follows:
Article 61 (9): After the charges are confirmed and before the trial has begun, the
Prosecutor may,with the permission of the Pre-Trial Chamber and after notice to
the accused, amend the charges. If the Prosecutor seeks to add additional charges
or to substitute more serious charges, a hearing under this article to confirm those
charges must be held. After commencement of the trial, the Prosecutor may, with
the permission of the Trial Chamber, withdraw the charges.
Regulation 55: 1. In its decision under article 74, the Chamber may change the
legal characterisation of facts to accord with the crimes under articles 6, 7 or 8, or
to accord with the form of participation of the accused under articles 25 and 28,
without exceeding the facts and circumstances described in the charges and any
amendments to the charges.
2. If, at any time during the trial, it appears to the Chamber that the legal
characterisation of facts may be subject to change, the Chamber shall give notice
to the participants of such a possibility and having heard the evidence, shall, at an
appropriate stage of the proceedings, give the participants the opportunity to make
oral or written submissions. The Chamber may suspend the hearing to ensure that
the participants have adequate time and facilities for effective preparation or, if
necessary, it may order a hearing to consider all matters relevant to the proposed
change.
3. For the purposes of sub-regulation 2, the Chamber shall, in particular, ensure
that the accused shall:
(a) Have adequate time and facilities for the effective preparation of his
or her defence in accordance with article 67, paragraph 1 (b); and
(b) If necessary, be given the opportunity to examine again, or have
examined again, a previous witness, to call a new witness or to present other
evidence admissible under the Statute in accordance with article 67, paragraph 1
(e). Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 37 I.L.M 1002 (1998), 2187
U.N.T.S. 90.
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own motion once the trial has commenced. Regulation 55 fits
within the procedural framework because at the confirmation
hearing, the Prosecutor needs only to "support each charge with
sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe,"
whereas during trial, the onus is on the Prosecutor to prove
"guilt beyond reasonable doubt." Thus, in the Appeals
Chamber's view, article 61(9) of the Statute and Regulation 55
address different powers of different entities at different stages
of the procedure, and the two provisions are therefore not
inherently incompatible. Second, the Appeals Chamber notes
that Mr Lubanga Dyilo's interpretation of article 61(9) of the
Statute bears the risk of acquittals that are merely the result of
legal qualifications confirmed in the pre-trial phase that turn out
to be incorrect, in particular based on the evidence presented at
the trial. This would be contrary to the aim of the Statute to "put
an end to impunity" (fifth paragraph of the Preamble). The
Appeals Chamber is of the view that a principal purpose of
Regulation 55 is to close accountability gaps, a purpose that is
fully consistent with the Statute.36 (footnotes omitted)

¶24

The result of the proceedings on appeal was favourable to
the accused, as the Trial Chamber’s interpretation of Regulation 55,
allowing it to add new facts and circumstances not described in the
charges, was ruled to be incompatible with Article 61(9) of the
Statute. But this does not alter the fact that in its interpretation of the
Statute the Appeals Chamber referred to “risks of acquittal” and
again uses the fight against impunity as an important interpretative
tool. This is an accident waiting to happen. Once this sets in as “firm
case law,” it is open to Chambers to use vague connotations like the
fight against impunity to creatively mould the Statute. I propose that
these preambular sections, which explain and underlie the creation
of the ICC, no longer receive interpretative importance. Rather, it is
recommended that “delivering justice” guides the Chambers in their
interpretation of the Statute. Unfortunate references to “risks of
acquittals” are less likely to be reproduced when the neutral object
and purpose of “delivering justice” replaces the “fight against
impunity.”
V. PERSISTING PROBLEMS IN SECURING THE RIGHT TO LIBERTY

¶25

One of the weakest aspects in terms of human rights law in
the functioning of international criminal tribunals is the right to
liberty. The law of the ICTY and ICTR has been defective for a
36

Lubanga, Judgement, supra note 34, ¶ 77.
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long time and still is. Rule 65 (B) of these Tribunals stipulated for a
considerable number of years that “[r]elease may be ordered by a
Trial Chamber only in exceptional circumstances…,” turning human
rights law on its head, according to which liberty is the rule and
detention the exception.37 The Rule was amended for the ICTY in
1999 and has removed the reference to exceptional circumstances.
Still, the law is flawed. Rule 65 deals with provisional release and
puts the burden of proof in these applications on the defendant. It
takes detention thus as the starting point. In the Statute and Rules
there are no conditions for the issuance of warrants for arrest and
detention, except that sufficient evidence exists.38 Thus, the
Prosecutor does not have to prove any grounds justifying detention,
such as the risk of flight. Rather, the burden of proof lies with the
defendant, in the context of an application for provisional release, to
satisfy the Chamber that he will appear for trial and, if released, will
not pose a danger to any victim, witness or other person. This
reversal of the burden—viewed in the absence of initial
determination that grounds justifying arrest exist39—violates human
rights law. From the case-law of the European Court of Human
Rights it follows that a person charged with an offence must always
37

Article 9(3) of the ICCPR stipulates that it shall not be the general rule that
persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody. See on that provision General
Comment 08 (16) of the Human Rights Committee (A/37/40 (1982) Annex V (at
95–6): “Pre-trial detention should be an exception and as short as possible.”
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171; S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978); S. Treaty Doc. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967).
38
Article 19 of the ICTY Statute governs this procedure:
1. The judge of the Trial Chamber to whom the indictment has been
transmitted shall review it. If satisfied that a prima facie case has been
established by the Prosecutor, he shall confirm the indictment. If not so
satisfied, the indictment shall be dismissed.
2. Upon confirmation of an indictment, the judge may, at the request of
the Prosecutor, issue such orders and warrants for the arrest, detention,
surrender or transfer of persons, and any other orders as may be required
for the conduct of the trial. S.C. Res. 808, ¶ 98, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808
(May 3, 1993).
39
The following grounds are recognized justifications for detention in case law
from the European Court of Human Rights: the risk that the accused will fail to
appear for trial; the risk that the accused would take action to prejudice the
administration of justice or commit further offences or cause public disorder; and
the risk that release may give rise, by reason of the particular gravity of the
accusations and public reaction to them, to a social disturbance. Letellier v.
France, App. No. 12369/86 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. ¶ 35 (1991).
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be released pending trial unless the state can show that there are
relevant and sufficient reasons to justify continued detention.40
The law of the ICC is a strong improvement compared to the
law of the ICTY and ICTR on habeas corpus. At least two elements
must be mentioned. First, contrary to the law of the ICTY and ICTR,
the ICC Statute puts the burden of proof on the Prosecutor to not
only satisfy the Chamber that there exists sufficient evidence
justifying arrest and detention, but also that the arrest appears
necessary for specific reasons.41 Second, the ICC Statute contains
better safeguards for periodical review of detention and for ensuring
that a person is not detained for an unreasonable period prior to
trial.42
In light of this improved system it seems logical that the
issue of almost automatic pre-trial detention is approached more
critically by ICC Chambers. Indeed, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber,
acting through Single Judge Trendafilova, decided in the Bemba

40

Smirnova v. Russia, App. No. 46133/99 and 48183/99 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec.
& Rep., ¶ 59 (2003).
41
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 58(1) (“At any time
after the initiation of an investigation, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall, on the
application of the Prosecutor, issue a warrant of arrest of a person if, having
examined the application and the evidence or other information submitted by the
Prosecutor, it is satisfied that:
(a) There are reasonable grounds to believe that the person has
committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; and
(b) The arrest of the person appears necessary:
(i) To ensure the person's appearance at trial;
(ii) To ensure that the person does not obstruct or endanger the
investigation or the court proceedings; or
(iii) Where applicable, to prevent the person from continuing
with the commission of that crime or a related crime which is
within the jurisdiction of the Court and which arises out of the
same circumstances”).
42
Id. art. 60 (3)- (4) (“3. The Pre-Trial Chamber shall periodically review its
ruling on the release or detention of the person, and may do so at any time on the
request of the Prosecutor or the person. Upon such review, it may modify its
ruling as to detention, release or conditions of release, if it is satisfied that changed
circumstances so require.
4. The Pre-Trial Chamber shall ensure that a person is not detained for an
unreasonable period prior to trial due to inexcusable delay by the Prosecutor. If
such delay occurs, the Court shall consider releasing the person, with or without
conditions”).
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case that the defendant should be conditionally released.43 The
Decision paid proper respect to applicable human rights law:
35. The Single Judge wishes to recall that article 60(3) of the
Statute, as any other statutory provision, must be interpreted and
applied in accordance with internationally recognized human
rights, as provided for in article 21(3) of the Statute. The right of
an arrested person to have access to a judicial authority vested
with the power to adjudicate upon the lawfulness and
justification of his or her detention is enshrined in many
international human rights instruments, such as article 9 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 9 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 5 of
the (European) Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, article 6 of the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights and article 7 of the American
Convention on Human Rights.
36. The Single Judge further recalls the 14 April 2009 Decision
in which she stressed that "when dealing with the right to
liberty, one should be mindful of the fundamental principle that
deprivation of liberty should be an exception and not a rule
(emphasis added).
37. The Single Judge wishes to clarify that this fundamental
principle, a corollary of the presumption of innocence provided
in article 66 of the Statute, continues to be the guiding principle
upon which the present review is based.
38. The Single Judge also emphasizes that pre-trial detention is
not to be considered as pre-trial punishment and shall not be
used for punitive purposes. The Single Judge's task is to weigh
up and balance the factors presented to her, mindful of the
particular circumstances of each individual case.44 (footnotes
omitted)

¶28

In a principled, and in my view correct, approach to
detention on remand, the Single Judge decided on the examination

43

Pre-Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Central African Republic, Prosecutor v.
Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-475, Decision on the Interim Release of Jean-Pierre
Bemba Gombo and Convening Hearings with the Kingdom of Belgium, the
Republic of Portugal, the Republic of France, the Federal Republic of Germany,
the Italian Republic, and the Republic of South Africa (Aug. 14, 2009)
[hereinafter Bemba Decision].
44
Id. ¶¶ 35-38.
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of the facts that the detention of Mr. Bemba appeared no longer
necessary:
In conclusion, the Single Judge holds that the continued
detention of Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba does not appear necessary
to ensure his appearance at trial in accordance with article
58(l)(b)(i) of the Statute. The Single Judge also concludes that
the continued detention is not necessitated by the other two
alternatives encapsulated in article 58(l)(b)(ii) and (iii) of the
Statute. Recalling that the decision on continued detention or
release is not of a discretionary nature, and mindful of the
underlying principle that deprivation of liberty is the exception
and not the rule, the Single Judge decides that Mr. Jean-Pierre
Bemba shall therefore be released, albeit under conditions.45

¶29

¶30

¶31

¶32

But the Single Judge determined “that the implementation of
this decision is deferred pending a decision by the Chamber on the
set of conditions to be imposed on Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba, the state
to which he is to be released and all necessary arrangements have
been put in place.”46
The decision from the Single Judge was overturned by the
Appeals Chamber.47 Its judgement demonstrates that international
criminal tribunals, in spite of improvements in the applicable law,
still fail to come to grips with the right to liberty. The following
flaws taint the judgement:
First, contrary to the Single Judge, the Appeals Chamber
does not seem to address this issue in light of the superior position
of human rights law in the Court’s applicable law, as set out in
Article 21(3) of the ICC Statute. No reference is made to the
essential principles of the right to liberty or human rights (case) law.
Second, one notices that the Appeals Chamber attributes
significant importance to the “… length of sentence that Mr. Bemba
is likely to serve if convicted on these charges …” as an incentive
for him to abscond.48 Such considerations are inappropriate. They
45

Id. ¶ 77.
Id. ¶ 78.
47
The Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Central African Republic, Prosecutor v.
Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-631 OA 2, Judgement on the appeal of the Prosecutor
against Pre-Trial Chamber II's “Decision on the Interim Release of Jean-Pierre
Bemba Gombo and Convening Hearings with the Kingdom of Belgium, the
Republic of Portugal, the Republic of France, the Federal Republic of Germany,
the Italian Republic, and the Republic of South Africa” (Dec. 2, 2009)[hereinafter
Bemba Judgement].
48
Id. ¶ 70.
46
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are inconsistent with the presumption of innocence and may unduly
influence trial judges in the determination of the sentence.
Furthermore, it is firmly established in human rights case law that
pre-trial detention cannot be based on anticipation of a lengthy
sentence of imprisonment.49
Third, the Appeals Chamber is on a wrong and dangerous
track when it imposes as a condition for a decision granting interim
release the prior identification of a state that is willing and able to
accept the person concerned.50 It did not elaborate on this and did
not, for example, explain the meaning of “able and willing.” It
seems to follow from reference to dependence upon state
cooperation that the Appeals Chamber regards this as a nonmandatory form of cooperation.51 As a result, the compliance with
fundamental human rights norms in the functioning of the ICC is
made completely dependent upon whether or not a state agrees to
accept a person who is eligible for release. The respect of
fundamental human rights norms cannot be made conditional upon
such highly uncertain factors. The Appeals Chamber does not
embark upon an analysis of the inevitable consequences of this
position; should we infer from this finding that even in the most
serious violations of the right to liberty a person will not be released
if not accepted by a state? The Single Judge adopted a better
approach:
The Single Judge emphasizes that the decision on interim
release ultimately rests with the Single Judge, who is mandated
to examine the prerequisites for any deprivation of liberty, based
on the law exclusively and the specific circumstances of the
case. The fact that States may have not provided guarantees
cannot weigh heavily against Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba's release.
Neither are conditions of "guarantees" proposed by the States a
prior indispensable requirement for granting interim release;
rather they provide assurance to the Single Judge.52

¶34

What is missing in both instances, but especially in the
Appeals Chamber decision, is an adequate analysis of and answer to
the questions of whether and how State Parties must cooperate with
49

Letellier v. France, 207 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 35 (1991).
See Bemba Judgement, supra note 47, ¶ 106.
51
See id. ¶ 107.
52
Bemba Decision, supra note 43, ¶ 88 (internal citations omitted).
50
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the Court in ensuring protection of the right to liberty. The Single
Judge emphasized the existence of the duty to cooperate for State
Parties set out in Part 9, with Article 86 as the general provision, and
also rightly mentioned that this duty concerns the entire Statute,
including Part 5.53 But with the hearing on implementation of the
decision still to be held, the Single Judge did not determine the
existence of a duty for (certain) states to cooperate in the interim
release of Mr. Bemba. The Appeals Chamber, regrettably, refrained
from any reference to Part 9; we can conclude, as was already
mentioned, that it does not consider assistance in the protection of
the right to liberty to fall within the ambit of the ICC’s cooperation
regime. This follows, among other things, from the importance
attached by the Appeals Chamber to Rule 119(3), obliging the
Chamber to seek the views of relevant states before conditional
release is ordered.54 But it is a non-sequitur, when the Appeals
Chamber infers from this procedural obligation that a “willing State”
must be identified prior to a decision on conditional release.55 There
is no basis for this interpretation provided and, painfully, it is not put
into the proper context of duties of states under Part 9.
It is my view that Part 9 should not be restricted to effective
assistance in investigations and prosecutions. Such emphasis, again,
creates the risk of pro-prosecution bias. The duty of states to
cooperate includes all matters related to investigations and
prosecutions, especially when non-cooperation entails the violation
of human rights. This interpretation of Article 86—and other
Articles in Part 9—is not only preferable, it is also obligatory
pursuant to Article 21(3) of the Statute. Furthermore, the specific
situation of assisting in interim release is governed by Article 93.
The chapeau of Article 93(1) makes reference to “assistance in
relation to investigations or prosecutions.”56 There can be no doubt
that assistance in respect of Bemba’s interim release is related to the
Court’s prosecution. It must be acknowledged that assistance in
release is not specifically provided for in Article 93, and therefore
has to be accommodated under the residual clause, Article 93(1)(l).57
53

Id. ¶¶ 85-86.
See Bemba Judgement, supra note 47, ¶ 106.
55
Id.
56
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 93 (emphasis added).
57
Id. art. 93(1)(l) (“Any other type of assistance which is not prohibited by the
law of the requested State, with a view to facilitating the investigation and
prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court”).
54
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Although this provision refers to “facilitating the investigation and
prosecution,” an interpretation in light of the obligation set out in
Article 21(3) can have no other result than that State Parties must
cooperate with the Court in ensuring the right to liberty.
From a practical perspective, the question arises as to which
state should be targeted with this obligation. Especially when the
state of arrest or residence is not an obvious choice, because of
political instability or inability to supervise conditions of detention,
alternatives have to be considered. One of these alternatives could
be the state party where (direct) relatives reside. A few words need
to be said about the role of the host state, the Netherlands, in
assisting international criminal tribunals in protecting the right to
liberty. The host state has shown persistent reluctance in accepting
conditionally released individuals on its territory.58 Regrettably, it
has never offered its services to ensure proper protection of the right
to liberty by institutions functioning on Dutch territory. But it needs
to be borne in mind that Article 5 of the ECHR and Article 9 of the
ICCPR impose obligations on the Netherlands, which, at a very
minimum, require it to engage constructively with the ICC in
ensuring the protection of the right to liberty of individuals present
on Dutch territory.
VI. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

¶37

We have witnessed many spectacular developments in
international criminal justice in 2009. In this contribution I have
selected the developments that should give rise to concern. Based on
a number of decisions in 2009, human rights protection remains the
Achilles heel of international criminal justice. The trend remains
undeniably pro-prosecution, both in respect of the interpretation of
the law in general, and in respect of concrete human rights. For a
system that should be growing in maturity it is disappointing that
this trend is so tenacious and that little progress seems to be made.
Maybe this is because the pro-prosecution bias is so much at the
heart of the international criminal justice system. To improve this,
58

In respect to the ICTY, the host State has expressed regular concern that the
provisionally-released accused lacks an adequate residence permit for the
Netherlands. See JOHN R.W.D. JONES & STEVEN POWLES, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL PRACTICE 609-10 (Ardsley, New York: Transnational Publishers 2003).
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and to preserve the legitimacy of the international criminal justice
system in the long run, I have three concrete recommendations.
First, the “fight against impunity” or “closing the impunity
gap” must be abolished or severely restricted as an interpretive tool.
Instead, delivering justice should guide judges in their interpretation
of the law.
Second, international criminal tribunals must take human
rights seriously. This implies that the law and case law of
international human rights courts must be followed. Any deviation
must be exceptional and based on convincing arguments.
Furthermore, such deviation cannot, by definition, result in less
protection.
Third and finally, it is worth seriously exploring the
possibility of external supervision of international criminal tribunals
for their compliance with human rights law. For any justice system,
including the international criminal justice system, however perfect
it may be, external checks, with the necessary distance, are vital.

